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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The goal of this study was to assess the efficacy of a newly developed "method factor" 
measure of faking to control for the effects of faking when personality tests are used to predict 
performance criteria. Traditional measures of faking, such as social desirability scales, have not 
been found to adequately control for faking. This study assessed the adequacy of the newly 
developed measure. When controlling for faking, as measured by the method factor, the validity 
of conscientiousness as a predictor of undergraduate GPA was larger. Additionally, the nature of 
the method factor across experimental conditions was investigated. The method factor was found 
to be positively correlated with self-esteem and negatively correlated with depression in an 
honest condition. It was positively correlated with cognitive ability in an instructed faking 
condition. However, no clear evidence identifying the faking factor was found in an incentive-to-
fake condition. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The use of personality assessments has grown dramatically over the past 30 years (Hough 
& Oswald, 2008). However, there are advantages and disadvantages to using personality 
assessments as a means for personnel selection. Advantages include the potential for reduced 
adverse impact when personality assessments are used with or instead of other types of 
assessments (e.g., cognitive ability tests) (Neuman & Lyon, 2009). Additionally, personality 
assessments provide an objective measure of personality that can be easily interpreted and 
compared across individuals (Costa, 1996). Selection specialists have developed methods to 
employ personality assessments in the workplace effectively, using these instruments to select 
better employees and create professional development plans for employees based on their 
strengths and weaknesses. Some disadvantages of using personality assessments concerns the 
low criterion-related validity of personality assessments, thus making selection specialists and 
organizations face the trade-off between high validity of cognitive ability tests and low adverse 
impact of personality assessments (Morgeson, Campion, Dipboye, Hollenbeck, Murphy, and 
Schmitt, 2007). Additionally, faking of personality tests is a pressing concern of selection 
specialists (Peterson, Griffith, & Converse, 2009). When individuals fake on personality test, the 
validity of the tests may be decreased, making the test less useful for the selection of employees 
who will be hired for an organization and stay with that organization. 
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The identification of the Big Five personality dimensions (Goldberg, 1993) has given 
selection specialists a framework from which to predict applicant performance, and the general 
absence of adverse impact associated with personality tests has afforded protection of minority 
applicants from test bias in the selection process. Although the Big Five personality dimensions 
have been most frequently studied, other personality inventories have been used in organizations, 
including the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (Briggs & Myers, 1998) and the Hartman Value 
Profile (Hartman, 1973). When studying personality, conscientiousness and emotional stability 
have been linked to performance in multiple jobs, exhibiting correlations of about .20; however, 
the links between other Big Five constructs and criteria variables have been only modest 
(Trapmann, Hell, Hirn, & Schuler, 2007).While this is the case, personality is visible and has a 
great deal of appeal in the workplace. Managers intuitively feel that personality works and there 
is growing research to support the Big Five framework in the study of personality. 
One of the major issues with personality is that it is primarily assessed through self-report 
measures. Because prospective employees know that employers are looking for certain traits, 
they have the potential to fake their responses in a way that would get them into a desired 
position. There have been two general concerns about faking. The first concern stems from the 
possibility that the existence of faking may decrease test validity – the correlation between test 
scores and criterion scores (Hough, Eaton, Dunnette, Kamp, & McCloy, 1990). This concern 
stems from the assumption that one’s score on a personality dimension, such as agreeableness, is 
the sum of his/her actual agreeableness in addition to a faking distortion. This faking distortion is 
the basis of this concern. If the distortion is uncorrelated with the criterion, then it will decrease 
validity. Hough et al. (1990) found that respondents successfully distorted their self-descriptions 
when instructed to do so and validity scales were responsive to different types of distortion. The 
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second concern is the effect of faking on the rank order of applicants in top-down selection 
situations (Christiansen, Rozek, & Burns, 2010; Peterson et al, 2009).  
Winkelspecht, Lewis, and Thomas (2006) found that those instructed to fake were often 
over-represented at the top of the score distributions as instructions to fake resulted in higher 
scores both between and within groups in a test-retest situation. There was significantly lower 
correspondence between participants' honest scores and their faked scores as well as multiple 
instances where participants with unfavorable honest scores subsequently produced the most 
favorable scores when faking. Response distortion may remain a serious threat to the use of 
personality test scores in selection. 
Peterson et al. (2009) found that the combinations of conscientiousness and cognitive 
ability resulted in as much as a 13.50% reduction in hiring fakers compared to a 
conscientiousness measure alone although most of these differences were not statistically 
significant. However, the use of cognitive ability–conscientiousness combinations did result in 
significant reductions in hiring discrepancies, suggesting that the use of multiple predictors is 
effective in reducing the impact of faking on hiring discrepancies over the use of a personality 
measure alone, this reduction may not be large enough to eliminate concern over the occurrence 
of faking. 
Christiansen et al. (2010) assessed practitioners working in the area of selection and 
assessment. The participants read descriptions of a managerial position and the assessment 
profiles of two hypothetical candidates who were finalists for a job. In the candidate profiles, 
there were scores from cognitive ability and personality tests, which included information on 
socially desirable responding. There were three conditions: no social desirability scores, differing 
social desirability scores between candidates, and elevated social desirability scores for both 
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candidates. The results indicated that elevated social desirability scores were used as personality 
information and the practitioners would infer that candidates were less sincere and the candidates 
were judged less hirable. Additionally, with the presence of this information, less weight was 
given to the personality assessment. However, even when social desirability scores were 
elevated, personality test results had more influence on hiring judgments than scores on the 
cognitive tests. If the faking distortion is added to each potential candidate’s trait scale score, 
those who distorted the most, better fakers, will have the highest scores and be selected first. 
This would mean that in the presence of individual differences in faking, those who faked the 
most would be most likely to be hired.  
Practitioners are trying to combat this issue in different ways. Goffin and Christiansen 
(2003) found that those who were experienced in using personality tests for industrial-
organizational purposes (e.g., personnel selection), generally favored the use of faking 
corrections, 69% favoring such corrections, typically social desirability scores. Practitioners have 
tried to create conditions in which the respondents will not fake by implementing warning 
instructions within the assessment to make sure that applicants know faking can be detected and 
there will be consequences for such behavior (e.g., McFarland, 2003). In an effort to reduce 
faking on personality tests, McFarland (2003) tested the theory that applicants may be warned 
that a social desirability scale is embedded in the test because this procedure of controlling for 
faking had been shown to substantially reduce faking, but there was no research addressing the 
how the applicant would react to such instructions. Using an organizational justice framework, 
this study examined the effect of warning on procedural justice perceptions, finding that the 
warning did not negatively affect test-taker reactions and seemingly has positive consequences 
when using personality measures. However, such instructions have the potential to decrease 
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scores, causing honest applicants to respond in a way to avoid consequences because there were 
differences across warned conditions and unwarned conditions in relation to the personality 
constructs. 
There are also methods of designing tests that are not subject to faking, e.g., by using 
forced-choice items or other types of items that are difficult to fake (Heggestad, Morrison, 
Reeve, & McCloy, 2006); however, all tests cannot be designed in such a way. An alternative 
area of research is that geared toward measuring faking and controlling for faking. It may be 
advantageous to embrace the fact that there will be response distortion, especially in high stakes 
conditions, measure it, and use it as a predictor. This study was designed to provide information 
that may be necessary to achieve that goal.  
There are, however, concerns with measuring faking. Two forms of faking should be 
defined regarding this study. Ordinary faking is that which occurs when respondents are asked to 
respond honestly, but distort their responses. This distortion can occur for a number of reasons, 
including the incentives associated with the test or individual personality characteristics. 
Instructed faking, on the other hand, occurs when a respondent is given instructions to fake good, 
to intentionally distort responses for the sake of the research at hand. This study employed both 
an instructed faking condition and a condition in which an incentive to fake good was provided. 
There is consistency regarding the idea that faking exists, and the notion that this 
distortion occurs in the form of positive distortion (Hough, 1998); however, there is no 
consistency or agreement on the proper way to measure faking. There have been, primarily, three 
methods used to measure and statistically control for faking. These methods are the use of social 
desirability scales, difference scores, and factor scores as a means to measure faking and then 
control for it. Social desirability is defined as the tendency of respondents to respond to a 
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measure in a way that is viewed as socially acceptable (Paulhus, 1984). Theoretically, controlling 
for the tendency of a person to bias his response in a way that is more socially acceptable versus 
his true response should serve as a means to control for the faking distortion.  
The use of difference scores involves comparing the mean responses of participants in 
faking conditions with mean responses on participants in honest responding conditions 
(McFarland & Ryan, 2006). The theoretical underpinning is that those in the faking conditions 
would have scores that are statistically higher than those that are in the honest conditions.  
The third method of controlling for faking involves using factor scores as a means to 
control for the distortion (Schmit & Ryan, 1993). By using a structural equation model and 
estimating the factor scores of the participants based on the model, the faking distortion can be 
controlled for (Biderman & Nguyen, 2004). The Big Five factor scores estimated from the 
structural equation model, which incorporates a faking factor, are presumably “purer” estimates 
of their respective dimensions. 
 
Social Desirability as a Measure of Faking 
There has been some research suggesting that social desirability, the tendency of 
respondents to respond to a measure in a way that is viewed as socially acceptable, should be 
used as the method of controlling for faking. Ordinary faking is often conceptualized as social 
desirability (e.g., Jo, 2000) and therefore used as a measure of faking propensity. However, the 
use of social desirability measures to examine the issue of applicant faking has a long but rather 
unproductive history (Griffith & Peterson, 2008). 
Theoretically, those scoring high on socially desirability measures would be more likely 
to fake when responding to personality questionnaires. Goffin and Christiansen (2003) reviewed 
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a number of personality tests commonly used for personnel selection and found that some of the 
more popular tests provide a potential correction for faking, using social desirability scores. Jo 
(2000) developed a methodology for controlling social-desirability bias, using direct and indirect 
questioning to create methods factors within a structural-equation modeling context.  
While the use of social desirability scales as a means for controlling for faking has gained 
popularity, there is still mixed support for the use of the construct as a control for faking. In a 
meta-analysis examining the relationship between social desirability and measures of personality 
and performance, Ones, Viswesvaran, and Reiss (1996) examined whether social desirability 
functions as a predictor for a variety of criteria, as a suppressor, or as a mediator and found that it 
served as neither. They provided evidence that social desirability scales did not predict school 
success, task performance, counterproductive behaviors, and job performance. Furthermore, they 
argued that social desirability is not as much of a problem as some of the literature makes it out 
to be and not controlling for such a measure leaves the validity of personality measures intact. 
Ellingson, Sackett, and Hough (1999) evaluated the efficacy of a social desirability 
correction in approximating an individual's honest score on a self-response measure. Using a 
within-subjects design, they compared honest, faked, and corrected scores and found that 
correcting personality test scores using social desirability measures did not produce scores that 
were comparable to honest scores. Later, Kurtz, Tarquini, and Iobst (2008) found that social 
desirability scores were positively correlated with extraversion, agreeableness, and 
conscientiousness as rated by the self, roommate, and parent and that higher scores did not 
indicate lower validity of self-ratings, suggesting that social desirability measures of faking are 
contaminated with characteristics other than the propensity to distort responses.  
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Ellingson, Smith, and Sackett (2001) noted that social desirability alters the factor 
structure of personality measures. Therefore, they brought together four large data sets wherein 
different organizational samples responded to different personality measures and conducting four 
separate yet parallel investigations. Within each data set, individuals identified through a social 
desirability scale as responding in an honest manner were grouped together, and individuals 
identified as responding in a highly socially desirable manner were grouped together. Using 
various analyses, the fit of higher-order factor structure models was compared across the two 
groups. Results were the same for each data set. Social desirability had little influence on the 
higher order factor structures that characterized the relationships among the scales of the 
personality measures. 
There are additional issues with the use of social desirability scales in the measurement of 
faking in applicant settings. If social desirability measures are administered during the 
assessment process, it will lengthen the testing process and thus may measure the applicant at a 
different time, and possibly in a different cognitive state, than when assessed by the personality 
assessment.  
 
Difference Scores as Measures of Faking 
The use of difference scores involves comparing the mean responses of participants in 
faking conditions with mean responses on participants in honest responding conditions 
(McFarland & Ryan, 2006). In these studies, within-subjects designs are used and one or more 
difference scores are computed for each respondent by subtracting the mean of responses in the 
honest condition from the mean in the faking condition for each participant. Because a score is 
available for each respondent, the two-condition within-subjects design allows for the 
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opportunity to assess the relationships of faking to characteristics of individuals that might vary 
within conditions. Although such designs are advantageous for research purposes, inclusion of an 
honest response condition in a selection situation is difficult to accomplish. 
McFarland and Ryan (2000) noted that there were discrepant findings in the literature 
regarding the effects of applicant faking on the validity of noncognitive measures, possibly 
because of the failure of some studies to consider individual differences in faking. Therefore, 
they demonstrated considerable variance across individuals in the extent of faking 3 types of 
noncognitive measures – personality test, biodata inventory, and an integrity test. Participants 
completed measures honestly and with instructions to fake and the results indicated some 
measures were more difficult to fake than others. Using difference scores, the authors found that 
integrity, conscientiousness, and neuroticism were related to faking. In addition, individuals 
faked fairly consistently across the measures. 
McFarland and Ryan (2006) tested a model that integrated the theory of planned behavior 
with a model of faking presented by McFarland and Ryan (2000) to predict faking on a 
personality test. In the first study, the theory of planned behavior explained sizable variance in 
the intention to fake. In Study 2, the theory of planned behavior explained both the intention to 
fake and actual faking behavior. They used both difference scores and social desirability scales 
and found that both resulted in similar conclusions, but the difference scores were more strongly 
related to the variables in the model.  
There are some advantages to the difference score method because there is a score for 
each person and it does not require separate questionnaires to perform the analysis. This method 
directly assesses faking of the questionnaire under consideration. 
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The disadvantages associated with this method are that it assumes no faking in the honest 
condition, which is not necessarily correct. If this assumption is violated, difference scores 
represent only faking in excess of possible faking in the honest condition. Even if no faking 
occurs in the honest response condition, variability of behavior in that condition adds error 
variance to the difference scores, reducing reliability and decreasing the power to detect 
relationships of difference scores with other variables (Edwards, 2001). Additionally, this 
method is not usable in real world situations in which there is only a single applicant sample. 
 
Factor Scores as Measures of Faking 
Among the first studies to identify a potential faking factor was Schmit & Ryan (1993). 
They noted that the stability of 5-factor model of personality in job applicant populations has not 
been determined, citing conceptual and empirical evidence suggesting that similar factor 
structures should not be assumed across testing situations that have different purposes or 
consequences. They conducted a study that used exploratory factor analysis to examine the fit of 
the 5-factor model to NEO Five-Factor Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1989) test data from student 
and applicant samples. The 5-factor structure fit the student data but did not fit the applicant data. 
However, in an EFA of an applicant sample, they found that a six-factor solution fit the data best 
and that the sixth factor shared cross-loadings with four of the Big Five dimensions. They 
labeled the sixth factor an “ideal employee” factor. 
Cellar, Miller, Doverspike, and Klawsky (1996) extended Schmit and Ryan’s (1993) 
study by using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to estimate a sixth first order factor on which 
indicators from all of the Big five dimensions loaded. Confirmatory factor analysis was used to 
compare a five versus six-factor model in an applied setting. Cellar et al. (1996) found that 
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adding the sixth factor significantly improved fit of the CFA to both questionnaire (the NEO-PI) 
and bipolar adjective checklist data, although the sixth factor did not predict the criterion used in 
their study; Scales from the NEO-PI were significantly correlated with measures of training 
success, whereas scales from the bipolar inventory were not. 
Biderman and Nguyen (2004) compared model on data in which a situational judgment 
test and measures of the Big Five were administered under honest and fake good instructions. A 
model with latent variables representing the six measures and a seventh latent variable 
representing faking ability proved to be a useful representation of the data.  
Bӓckstrӧm (2007) compared several models using the IPIP 100-item Big Five five-factor 
personality inventory with a sample of 2,019 participants tested on the Internet. The models were 
compared using confirmatory factor analysis. The criteria for parsimony favored a model with 
one general factor on which all items loaded and five personality factors. In this study, the single 
general factor was found to be related to social desirability in a subsample of 196 subjects. 
Bӓckstrӧm, Bjorklund, and Larsson (2009) found that the factors in self-report 
inventories measuring the five-factor model (FFM) correlate with one another although they 
theoretically should not. In the first study, they found that across three different FFM-
questionnaires, almost all of the common variance between factors can be attributed to a single 
general factor related to social desirability. In the second study, they found that rephrasing the 
items from a FFM-questionnaire made them substantially less socially desirable, while the 
inventory’s empirical (five-factor) structure remained the same. Participants who scored low in 
social desirability demonstrated negligible difference between how they responded to the 
original items versus how they responded to the neutral items. For participants who were high in 
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social desirability the difference was considerably larger, suggesting that reducing social 
desirability in self-rating inventories could serve as a potential cure for the faking concern. 
Biderman and Nguyen (2009) investigated measuring faking propensity as a method 
factor estimated from a single condition. Faking propensity demonstrated convergent validity 
with difference score measures of faking and moderate convergent validity with social 
desirability measures. Faking propensity, as represented by the method factor, was unrelated to 
cognitive ability, indicating discriminant validity.  
Wrensen and Biderman (2005) defined the ability to fake the Big Five personality 
dimensions as a method factor from a structural equation model. Faking ability was positively 
related to cognitive ability, emotional intelligence, and integrity and was negatively related to 
social desirability. It was not related to any of the Big Five dimensions after controlling for 
cognitive ability. This result, when compared with the results of Biderman and Nguyen (2009) 
suggests that in different contexts the nature of the method factor shifts. Although the above 
studies are certainly encouraging, only a small subset of the literature has investigated whether 
using factor analytic methods yield measures of faking. The factor analytic methods has the 
potential to be useful in the assessment of personality, and thus, the goal of this study was to 
replicate previous studies, adding to that body of evidence, and providing further evidence for 
this method of controlling for faking.  
 
Nature of the Method Factor 
The behavior considered to be dissimulation or faking may differ according to the 
condition a given person is responding in. Ellingson, Sackett, and Connelly (2007) compared 
individual responses provided in an organizational context with high motivation to distort 
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(selection) and those provided in an organizational context with low motivation to distort 
(development). Seven hundred and thirteen individuals were identified as having completed the 
assessment twice: once for selection purposes and once for development purposes or twice for 
the same purpose. Scale-score analyses both within and across contexts revealed a limited degree 
of response distortion. While the distortion may have been limited, it is possible that it was 
contaminated because the reason to distort varies across conditions. 
Goffin and Boyd (2009) noted that personality testing is a particularly valuable 
preemployment assessment tool when one matches personality traits to job requirements. The 
authors suggested that personality testing’s contribution to personnel selection could be 
leveraged if more were known about the psychological process underlying applicant faking 
behavior, thus, as the secondary goal of this study, we aim to provide insight into the nature of 
faking behavior. 
In honest conditions, the faking factor scores have been found to correlate positively with 
self-esteem and negatively with depression (Biderman, Nguyen, & Cunningham, 2011). This 
finding suggests that when there are no incentives or instructions to fake, the method factor is an 
indication of how a person feels about themselves – their self-concept. 
Biderman & Nguyen (2004) found that when instructions were given, the faking factor 
correlated with cognitive ability. This finding suggests that when there are instructions to fake, 
the method factor is not necessarily an indication of self-concept or faking propensity. Instead, 
the method factor relates to cognitive ability, because of the problem-solving nature associated 
with receiving instructions and following those instructions well. Clark and Biderman (2006) 
obtained measures of several personality variables in a repeated measures design employing 
honest, incentive, and instructed-faking conditions. Application of a structural equation model 
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found faking propensity and faking ability latent variables to be uncorrelated. Faking ability was 
related to cognitive ability in this study. 
Biderman & Nguyen (2009) found that when incentives were given, the method factor 
correlated with social desirability, both the self-deception and impressions management scales, 
indicating that when incentives are involved, the method factor is related to faking propensity, as 
measured by social desirability scores.  
The purpose of the present study was to investigate this third way of measuring faking, 
which has been given less attention in the published literature on faking than social desirability 
or difference score measures, investigating the utility of measuring faking as a first-order factor 
in a confirmatory factor analytic.  
 
The Present Study 
For the present study, we explored the use of factor analytic techniques as a means of 
measuring faking, including a method bias as a factor along with the other personality factors in 
a confirmatory factor analytic model of Big Five personality data. Theoretically, Big Five scale 
scores (e.g., extraversion, conscientiousness) are contaminated with a common method bias. 
However, the source of this method bias is not identical for each situation in which a personality 
assessment may be administered. Using three conditions, honest responding, instructed faking, 
and incentive to fake, we assessed differences in this method bias across conditions.  
We had two major goals. The first goal was to assess the extent to which accounting for 
the new measure of faking would affect validity of conscientiousness. Specifically – would 
controlling for the new faking measure increase validity of conscientiousness as a predictor? 
Conscientiousness was used because it is the scale that has consistently shown a relationship 
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with performance criteria (Trapmann et al., 2007). This study assessed validity of 
conscientiousness scale scores and then assessed it again with conscientiousness factor scores, in 
which effects of faking had been removed. 
Hypothesis 1: Validity of factor scores in which effects of faking have been 
removed will be larger than validity of scale scores. 
The second goal of the study was based on the previous results of studies of the faking 
factor. We state the following hypotheses concerning the relationship of the faking factor to self-
esteem (SE), Depression (Dep), Cognitive Ability (CA), Social Desirability – Self-Deception 
(SD), and Social Desirability – Impression Management (IM). 
In the honest condition, respondents’ self-concept, as measured by a depression measure 
and a self-esteem measure will be assumed to determine the nature of the method bias. 
Hypothesis 2a: In the honest condition, factor scores will correlate positively with 
self-esteem scores and negatively with depression scores. 
Hypothesis 2b: In the instructed faking and incentive conditions, the correlations 
between the factor scores and the self-esteem scores will be negligible and the 
correlations between the factor scores and the depression scores will be negligible 
In the instructed faking condition, we believe that the problem solving nature of the task 
will overshadow individual differences in self-concept to the extent that those differences will no 
longer account for the method bias (Biderman &Nguyen, 2004; 2009). Instead, it is hypothesized 
that individual differences in problem solving ability, because of the instructions to fake, will 
control the differences in faking. Because of the nature of problem solving, it can be related to a 
measure of cognitive ability. 
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Hypothesis 3a: In the instructed faking condition, factor scores will correlate 
positively with cognitive ability scores. 
Hypothesis 3b: In the honest and incentive conditions, the correlations between 
the factor scores and the cognitive ability scores will be negligible. 
 In the incentive conditions, it is assumed here that self-concept and cognitive ability are 
taken out of the equation and no longer account for the method bias (Biderman, Nguyen, 2004; 
2009). Instead, it is hypothesized that in the incentive to fake condition, because of the 
instructions to fake in order to receive a prize, the method bias is then a measure of faking 
propensity. 
Hypothesis 4a: In the incentive condition, factor scores will correlate positively 
with social desirability scores. 
Hypothesis 4b: In the honest and instructed faking conditions, the correlations 
between the factor scores and the social desirability scores will be negligible. 
The last hypotheses are summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1  
Predicted Correlations (Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4) 
 Condition  
 Honest Faking Incentive 
Depression Negative None None 
Self-Esteem Positive None None 
Cognitive Ability None Positive None 
Self-Deception None None Positive 
Impression Management None None Positive 
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CHAPTER II 
 
METHOD 
Participants 
Participants were 216 undergraduate students enrolled in various psychology classes at the 
University of Tennessee at Chattanooga. Regarding race, 74.40% (n = 160) were Caucasian, 
19.50% (n = 42) were African American, 3.30% (n = 7) were biracial/multiracial, 1.40% (n = 3) 
Asian, and 1.40% (n = 3) Hispanic. Regarding sex, 72.60% (n = 156) were female and 27.40%  
(n = 59) were male. The mean age of the participants was 20.13 years old (SD = 5.20). The mean 
number of undergraduate course hours taken was 34.60 hours (SD = 32.49). 
 
Design 
Participants were given a battery of assessments. They were randomly assigned to the 
honest, instructed faking, and incentive conditions. IRB approval was obtained for this study 
(Appendix A) 
 
Procedure 
All participants filled out an informed consent form and a page of demographic 
information. After completion of the above forms, the Wonderlic Personnel Test (WPT: 
Wonderlic, 1999) was administered. The students were then directed to two websites; the first 
website contained three measures and the second contained five measures. In the first website, 
the students were instructed to complete the Hartman Values Profile, the IPIP 50- item Big-Five
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personality inventory, and the Myers-Briggs Personality type indicator. After completing the 
three surveys on the first website, the students were directed to a second website that contained 
five measures. All participants completed the Rosenberg Self-Esteem (RSE) measure, followed 
by the Costello and Comrey measure, and the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding 
(BIDR). Order of administration of the scales was the same for all participants.  
After those were completed, the participants received instruction in one of three 
conditions: honest, faking, and incentive. After receiving instructions, the participants responded 
to a second IPIP 50- item Big-Five personality inventory and then completed the Work Traits 
assessment. All students were given the opportunity to be entered into a drawing for one of two 
gift certificates to a local mall. 
 
Condition Instructions 
The instructions for each condition were as follows. 
 
Honest condition. In this part of the study, you will be asked to complete a personality 
assessment. Please respond to all of the questions on the measure as honestly as you can. 
Remember, your responses are for research purposes only and will be held in strict confidence, 
not to be shared with anyone. 
 
Instructed faking condition. In this part of the study, you will be asked to complete a 
personality assessment. Please respond to all of the questions on the measure as if you were 
applying for the job of customer service representative. Some examples of customer service jobs 
include bank teller and call center representative. Respond to the measure in a way that would 
guarantee that you would get the customer service job. In other words, you are asked to respond 
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as if you were someone who needed the job so bad that if stretching or embellishing yourself a 
bit would get you the job, you would go ahead and do it. Remember, your responses are for 
research purposes only and will be held in strict confidence, not to be shared with anyone. 
 
Incentive condition. In this part of the study, you will be asked to complete a personality 
assessment. All individuals who fill out the Prize Drawing Form at the end of the experiment 
will be entered into a drawing for a $50 gift certificate to Hamilton Place Mall. Based on the 
responses to this section, the twenty participants who would make the BEST candidates for 
employment will be entered into another drawing for an additional $50 gift certificate. The 
winners will be notified by email. Remember, your responses are for research purposes only and 
will be held in strict confidence, not to be shared with anyone. 
 
Measures 
The following measures were analyzed for this study. 
 
Wonderlic Personnel Test (WPT). The WPT Form II (Wonderlic Inc., 1999) was given 
to all participants prior to any other questionnaires. The WPT is is a twelve-minute, fifty-
question test used to assess the aptitude of prospective employees for learning and problem-
solving in a range of occupations. The score is calculated as the number of correct answers given 
in the allotted time. A score of 20 is intended to indicate average intelligence. 
 
IPIP Big Five (100 items). The 100-item questionnaire available on the IPIP web site 
was administered to participants in two 50-item portions. There is a 50-item questionnaire, and 
the 100-item questionnaire adds 50 additional items to the questionnaire used for two equivalent 
parts (Appendices B, C). In the first portion the study, the participants responded to the first 50-
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item questionnaire on a 7-point scale indicating how accurately each item described them with 1 
representing “Very inaccurate” and 7 representing “Very accurate”. In the second portion of the 
study, the participants responded to the second 50-item questionnaire on a 7-point scale 
indicating how accurately each item described them with 1 representing “Very inaccurate” and 7 
representing “Very accurate”. In the first portion of the study, items were displayed one-at-a-
time using a web-delivered survey. In the second portion of the study, items were displayed with 
a maximum of 20 items to a page. In both portions, participants responded by clicking on a 
check box indicating the preferred response. 
 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem measure (RSE). According to Rosenberg (1965), self-esteem is 
a unidimensional construct reflecting positive or negative attitudes toward the self. For this 
reason, the Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale, RSE was originally designed to assess global self-
esteem as one factor based on 10 items which are a combination of positively and negatively 
worded items (Marsh, Scalas, & Nagengast, 2010). The participants responded to the measure on 
a 7-point scale indicating how accurately each item described them with 1 representing “Very 
inaccurate” and 7 representing “Very accurate” (Appendix D). All items were displayed on the 
screen at the same time. 
 
Costello and Comrey Depression measure (CCD). This 14-item self-report 
questionnaire was designed specifically to measure intensity of depressive affect, or "a person's 
tendency to experience a depressive mood" and a combination of low self-esteem and a negative 
self-concept, which are cited as prominent features of depression (Costello & Comrey, 1967). 
The participants responded to the measure on a 7-point scale indicating how accurately each item 
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described them with 1 representing “Very inaccurate” and 7 representing “Very accurate” 
(Appendix E). All items were displayed on the screen at the same time. 
 
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR). In the second portion of the 
study, the BIDR Version 6 – Form 40 was administered before the Big Five given under 
instructions to respond honestly. The BIDR has two scales composed of 20 items each. The first 
twenty items are representative of self-deceptive responding (SD) and the second twenty items 
are representative of impression management (IM). Paulhus has investigated social desirability 
construct and asserts that socially desirable responding is composed of two separate factors: self-
deception and impression management (Paulhus, 1984). The self-deception factor represents 
response distortion resulting from an unconscious tendency to provide inflated, positive self-
reports. The respondents truly feel that their responses are indicative of their actual personality 
traits and view those responses as part of their internal perception of themselves. The impression 
management factor represents response distortion that is due to intentional faking or what the 
respondent consciously does as a means to ensure they are viewed as socially acceptable. The 
participants responded to the measure on a 7-point scale indicating how accurately each item 
described them with 1 representing “Not true and all” and 7 representing “Very true” (Appendix 
F). Up to 20 items were displayed on the screen at a time. 
 
Criterion. Because of the use of undergraduate students in this study, undergraduate 
grade point average (GPA) was used as the criterion variable, indicative of the student’s 
performance at the university level. 
Screen shots of websites 1 and 2 are provided in Appendices G and H respectively. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
RESULTS 
 To permit comparison with other research involving the same personality questionnaires, 
means, standard deviations, correlations and reliability coefficients of Big Five dimension scores, 
Costello and Comrey depression scores, Rosenberg self-esteem scores, Wonderlic cognitive 
ability scores, BIDR Self Deception and Impression Management scores for all three conditions 
are presented in Tables 2, 3, and 4.  
Inspection of the means, standard deviations, and correlations between variables indicates 
the extent to which the instructional manipulations in the faking and incentive conditions 
resulted in response distortion. In general, if instructions to fake good or incentives to fake are 
given, we expect that the mean of responses to the each dimension will be larger in the instructed 
faking condition than in the honest response condition (Hough, 1998). Examination of the means 
in Tables 2, 3, and 4 across conditions indicate an increase in responses from the honest 
condition to the instructed faking and incentive conditions. Thus, the increases in mean response 
from the honest to the instructed faking and incentive conditions suggest that the faking 
manipulations were successful. 
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Table 2.  
Summary of Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of whole-scale scores for the Big Five dimensions – Honest Condition. 
Dimension 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 H E (.896)               
2 H A .240 (.760)              
3 H C .107 .307 (.860)             
4 H S .232 -.102 .053 (.903)            
5 H O .365 .239 .151 .048 (.821)           
6 H2 E .823 .289 .245 .281 .338 (.861)          
7 H2 A .433 .682 .298 .202 .205 .527 (.703)         
8 H2 C .147 .345 .823 -.193 .202 .248 .298 (.848)        
9 H2 S .325 .074 .106 .834 .191 .416 .272 -.073 (.862)       
10 H2 O .517 .259 .330 .184 .735 .508 .376 .380 .319 (.758)      
11 Dep -.236 .044 -.161 -.266 -.047 -.236 -.126 -.132 -.199 -.207 (.954)     
12 SE .229 -.052 .201 .224 .087 .216 .056 .190 .266 .186 -.688 (.911)    
13 CA .037 -.065 -.077 -.097 .213 .125 -.062 -.050 .013 .167 -.084 -.021 (.691)   
14 SD .404 .174 .375 .523 .208 .495 .357 .250 .574 .307 -.245 .414 -.222 (.559)  
15 IM .069 .286 .523 .093 .157 .217 .343 .445 .154 .267 -.040 .038 .038 .283 (.637) 
Mean 4.749 5.710 4.864 4.409 5.065 4.869 5.445 4.833 4.536 4.891 1.927 5.432 21.510 4.379 3.878 
SD 1.060 .711 .934 1.103 .772 .995 .694 .993 1.022 .759 1.014 1.124 4.379 .514 .602 
Note. H scales are from the first administration of Big Five.  H2 scales are from the honest condition  (n = 75). Reliabilities for each scale are presented on the 
diagonal. 
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Table 3  
Summary of Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of whole-scale scores for the Big Five dimensions – Instructed Faking 
Condition. 
Dimension 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 H E (.888)               
2 H A .360 (.828)              
3 H C -.040 .242 (.791)             
4 H S .054 .038 .025 (.861)            
5 H O .222 .380 .198 .347 (.844)           
6 F E .391 .349 .126 -.061 .297 (.858)          
7 F A .109 .485 -.010 .011 .322 .717 (.848)         
8 F C -.083 .251 .338 -.028 .194 .713 .665 (.905)        
9 F S -.085 .035 .045 .219 .258 .607 .637 .746 (.919)       
10 F O .063 .199 .090 .098 .482 .684 .700 .719 .789 (.881)      
11 Dep -.221 -.375 -.041 -.491 -.256 -.063 -.137 -.060 -.064 -.043 (.921)     
12 SE .239 .343 .141 .566 .265 .027 .094 .048 .012 .030 -.751 (.914)    
13 CA -.022 -.108 -.253 .138 .057 .250 .211 .211 .406 .310 .206 -.174 (.736)   
14 SD .118 .068 .392 .404 .290 .249 .043 .243 .115 .203 -.318 .387 -.067 (.755)  
15 IM .052 .217 .042 .327 .185 .065 .110 -.002 .021 .081 -.288 .286 -.006 .374 (.729) 
Mean 4.769 5.770 5.020 4.087 5.143 5.128 5.993 5.779 5.226 5.461 1.927 5.477 22.800 4.422 3.776 
SD 1.053 .752 .807 1.036 .795 .946 .789 1.028 1.308 1.001 .765 1.070 5.219 .655 .770 
Note. H scales are from the first administration of Big Five.  F scales are from the instructed faking condition (n = 70). Reliabilities for each scale are presented 
on the diagonal.  
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Table 4.  
Summary of Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of whole-scale scores for the Big Five dimensions – Incentive Condition. 
Dimension 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 H E (.880)               
2 H A .076 (.783)              
3 H C .093 .061 (.839)             
4 H S .145 -.002 -.044 (.875)            
5 H O .157 .111 .257 .219 (.861)           
6 I E .734 .315 .165 .261 .336 (.789)          
7 I A .277 .657 .144 .014 .227 .621 (.765)         
8 I C .179 .291 .618 .053 .365 .462 .495 (.847)        
9 I S .131 .056 -.144 .652 .136 .445 .246 .216 (.877)       
10 I O .188 .297 .174 .360 .766 .564 .480 .498 .442 (.833)      
11 Dep -.228 -.001 -.102 -.259 -.126 -.086 .036 .059 -.145 -.085 (.940)     
12 SE .187 -.039 .257 .268 .235 .144 -.062 .106 .155 .158 -.816 (.917)    
13 CA -.068 .157 -.193 .210 .299 .109 .141 .093 .176 .372 .048 -.031 (.783)   
14 SD .260 .057 .475 .379 .323 .354 .087 .317 .277 .298 -.288 .420 -.099 (.594)  
15 IM .012 .302 .256 .218 .076 .066 .222 .208 .067 .120 -.039 .039 -.212 .296 (.735) 
Mean 4.773 5.710 4.868 4.307 4.900 5.117 5.674 5.176 4.754 4.992 1.883 5.747 21.13 4.455 3.793 
SD .980 .724 .851 1.035 .864 .771 .719 .918 1.052 .893 .982 1.074 5.557 .529 .687 
Note. H scales are from the first administration of Big Five.  I scales are from the incentive condition  (n = 71). Reliabilities for each scale are presented on the 
diagonal. 
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Goodness-of-Fit  
Two models were tested. A confirmatory factor analysis was performed as a multigroup 
model with the method factor, M, indicated by all items in the personality assessment (Figure 1). 
The other model was a simple CFA model without the method factor (Figure 2). Table 5 
represents goodness-of-fit statistics for the models in figures 1 and 2. The first characteristic to 
note is that the goodness of fit statistics did not meet the recommended thresholds of 
acceptability. Although the fit measures of Model 1 are better, they do not reach acceptable 
levels for these measures of goodness-of-fit. There is accumulating evidence suggesting that 
goodness-of-fit is positively related to the coarseness of the indicators (e.g., Kenny & McCoach, 
2003); therefore, the poor values from the models applied to individual indicators were treated as 
reflecting idiosyncratic, item-specific deviations rather than systemic failures of the model. The 
chi-square (χ2) difference test indicates that Model 1 is a significantly better fit (Δχ2 = 748.876; 
df = 152, p < .001) 
 
Table 5  
Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for Models 1 and 2 
Model Chi-Square Df CFI RMSEA SRMR 
1  
(With M) 
6803.940
***
 3454 0.556 0.116 0.113 
      
2  
(Without M) 
7552.816
***
 3606 0.476 0.123 0.168 
Note. CFI = comparative fit index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; SRMR = standardized root 
mean square residual. 
*** p < .001. 
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Figure 1. CFA with one method bias factor as applied to the IPIP 50-item questionnaire.  
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Figure 2. CFA without method bias factor applied to the IPIP 50-item questionnaire.
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Parameter Estimates 
Mean loadings are presented in Table 6 for Model 1. For this model, all mean loadings of 
items on the Big Five factors were positive with means from the incentive condition about equal 
to those in the honest condition. Mean loadings on the method factors were also positive. The 
mean loading on the method factor for the instructed faking condition was the largest at 0.785 
indicating the elevation in positive responses associated with the instructed-faking condition. 
Additionally, mean r
2
 estimates for the model are provided in Table 7.  
 
Table 6  
Mean Trait Loadings 
 Dimensions 
Condition E A C S O M 
Honest .760 .639 .828 .871 .407 .467 
Faking .561 .507 .387 .735 .470 .785 
Incentive .519 .552 .762 .455 .667 .428 
 
 
Table 7  
Mean R-Square Statistics 
 Dimensions 
Condition E A C S O 
Honest .540 .327 .434 .407 .366 
Faking .496 .443 .544 .582 .502 
Incentive .353 .274 .412 .544 .354 
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Hypothesis Tests 
Hypothesis 1. Regression analyses were performed to test hypothesis 1. The regression 
analyses provided support for H1. When controlling for cognitive ability, as measured by the 
WPT, β = .082, p = .232 for conscientiousness scale scores and β = .131, p = .052 for 
conscientiousness factor scores, neither of which are significant. When controlling for cognitive 
ability and experimental condition, β = .113, p = .128 for conscientiousness scale scores and  
β = .143, p = .038 for conscientiousness factor scores. The regression analyses indicated that 
conscientiousness factor scores were more valid than scale scores, supporting H1.  
Hypothesis 2a and 2b. Correlation analyses were performed to test hypotheses 2a and 
2b. The results are presented in Table 8. Hypotheses 2a and 2b were supported. In the honest 
condition, factor scores were correlated positively with self-esteem scores and negatively with 
depression scores (H2a). In the faking and incentive conditions, the correlations between the 
factor scores and the self-esteem scores were negligible and the correlations between the factor 
scores and the depression scores were be negligible (H2b). 
 
Table 8 
Correlation Analyses of Hypothesis 2 
 Measures 
Condition Depression Self-Esteem 
Honest -.273
*
 .341
**
 
Faking -.061 .093 
Incentive -.118 .182 
Note. *  p < .05; ** p < .01 
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Hypotheses 3a and 3b. Correlation analyses were performed to test hypotheses 3. The 
results are presented in Table 9. Hypotheses 3a and 3b were supported. In the instructed faking 
condition, factor scores were correlated positively with cognitive ability scores (H3a). In the 
honest and incentive conditions, the correlations between the factor scores and the cognitive 
ability scores were negligible (H3b). 
 
Table 9 
Correlation Analyses of Hypothesis 3 
Condition Cognitive Ability 
Honest .123 
Faking   .261
a
 
Incentive .119 
Note. *  p < .05 
 
 
Hypotheses 4a and 4b. Correlation analyses were performed to test hypotheses 4. The 
results are presented in Table 10. Hypotheses 4a and 4b were not supported. In the incentive 
condition, factor scores were not correlated positively with social desirability scores, failing to 
show support for H4a. In the honest and instructed faking conditions, the correlations between 
the factor scores and the social desirability scores were not negligible, failing to show support for 
H4b. 
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Table 10 
Correlation Analyses of Hypothesis 4 
 Social Desirability Scale 
Condition Self-Deception Impression Management 
Honest .522
***
 .286
*
 
Faking .307
**
 .084 
Incentive .309
**
 .009 
Note. *  p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .01 
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CHAPTER IV  
 
DISCUSSION 
As predicted, the results confirmed Hypothesis 1–validity of conscientiousness is slightly 
larger when faking, operationalized as a first order factor, is taken into account. That is, presence 
of faking moderates the conscientiousness–performance relationship. Morgeson et al. (2007) 
noted that personality was long thought to be unrelated to job performance, but research in the 
early 1990s provided evidence that personality could predict job performance. However, they 
stated that there are numerous potential problems associated with the current operational use of 
personality. They concluded that faking on self-report personality tests cannot be avoided and the 
issue is not necessarily the faking but is more so the very low validity of personality tests for 
predicting job performance. They also noted that whatever contributes to faking might also 
contribute to job performance; therefore, it is important to extract the components of the method 
factor of faking and determine the nature of it across various situations that may occur within the 
selection and development realm.  
One of the primary concerns of the faking correction literature has been determining 
whether there is an impact on the validity of personality assessments (Rosse, Stecher, Miller, & 
Levin, 1998); if there is no impact, the faking correction is not a concern. This study is one of the 
first to find that accounting for faking can affect validity of personality tests, suggesting that that 
faking must be measured appropriately for its effects on validity to become apparent. Though 
some research has suggested that response distortion has little impact on the construct validity of 
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personality measures used in selection contexts (e.g., Smith and Ellingson, 2002), the method of 
detecting response distortion used in such studies (i.e., social desirability scores) are 
contaminated with other factors that cloud the impact on the validity of personality factors. 
Using this “pure” method of faking corrects for this contradiction. Furthermore, a “little” impact 
on the validity of personality tests could be the tipping point in deciding whether one should use 
such a measure in a selection system, or whether they should employ other methods. 
Results partially confirmed the set of hypotheses 2, 3, and 4. Hypotheses 2 was fully 
supported. In the honest condition, factor scores were correlated positively with self-esteem 
scores and negatively with depression scores (H2a) and in the faking and incentive conditions, 
the correlations between the factor scores and the self-esteem scores were negligible and the 
correlations between the factor scores and the depression scores were be negligible (H2b). This 
result is consistent with the Biderman et al. (2011) finding. In honest conditions, the faking 
factor scores correlate positively with self-esteem and negatively with depression, suggesting 
that when there are no incentives or instructions to fake, the method factor is an indication of 
how a person feels about themselves–their self-concept. Conceptually, this theory implies that 
the way a person feels about themselves at a given time is the bias possibly associated with the 
honest condition. Because this has been identified as a portion of the variance associated with the 
method factor of faking, future attention can focus on identifying and testing other characteristics 
of the method factor, outside of faking. 
Hypotheses 3 was fully supported. In the instructed faking condition, factor scores were 
correlated positively with cognitive ability scores (H3a) and in the honest and incentive 
conditions, the correlations between the factor scores and the cognitive ability scores were 
negligible (H3b). This result is consistent with the Biderman & Nguyen (2004) finding; when 
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instructions were given the faking factor correlated with cognitive ability, suggesting that when 
there are instructions to fake, the method factor shifts and relates to cognitive ability, because of 
the problem-solving nature associated with receiving instructions and following those 
instructions well.  The results found here extend the results of Biderman and Nguyen (2004) 
showing that it is not just faking in general, but specifically, instructed faking that is correlated 
with cognitive ability. This result implies that those who are higher in cognitive ability are better 
fakers, which suggests that fakers could have some positive characteristics. However, it is 
important to note the situational nature of this correlation and the cognitive ability-method factor 
relationship could disappear outside of the research condition of instructed faking. 
Hypothesis 4 was not supported. In the honest, faking, and incentive conditions, the self-
deception scale of the social desirability measure correlated positively significantly in all three 
conditions. Additionally, there was a positive correlation in the honest condition with the 
impression management scale of the social desirability measure. This finding is not consistent 
with the Biderman & Nguyen (2009) results, which found that when incentives were given, the 
method factor correlated with social desirability, suggesting that when incentives are involved, 
the method factor is related to faking propensity. The self-deception scale correlated positively in 
all conditions with the factor scores. A potential explanation of this concerns the nature of the 
self-deception scale, which is response distortion resulting from an unconscious tendency to 
provide inflated, positive self-reports. Because the response distortion is unconscious, it is 
possible that it has a positive relationship with the method factor across conditions, because of 
the additional variance in the method factor that has not been determined to date. Additionally, 
this result speaks to the unreliability of social desirability scores to serve as a consistent measure 
of faking propensity. 
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There are definite advantages to using the factor analytic approach as a measure of 
faking. Using this method, faking scores are available as predictors. Biderman, Nguyen, Mullins, 
and Luna (2008) found the method factor to be the only predictor of subjective criteria, which 
are the primary source of performance data used to establish criterion-related validity in many 
selection tools. Furthermore, the method is free–it only requires re-analysis of already existing 
data and there is no time associate with extending the length of the assessment process to 
measure the faking factor. Finally, the method may have benefits beyond measurement of 
faking–identifying people who are depressed, for example, when the Big Five questionnaire is 
administered with honest instructions. Such predictors could serve to enhance further the 
predictive nature of personality tests, above and beyond of the constructs they direct measure. 
 
Limitations 
The use of student samples limits the external validity of the results. Because the students 
are given instructions to fake and are not necessarily in the selection context, generalizabilty of 
these results is a primary limitation of the study. Regarding that matter, the majority of the 
students in the present study were freshmen (57.7%), restricting the range of hours they had 
taken to 24 hours and below (which impacts their GPA) and impacted the effectiveness of the 
GPA criterion variable. For example, the weight of the criterion variable for a freshman who has 
take 15 hours and earns a 4.0 GPA is weaker than that of a senior who has 90 hours and earns a 
4.0.  
Another limitation involves the sample size. Because of the smaller sample size, 
approximately 70 people per condition, the goodness-of-fit criteria associated with the model did 
not reach the acceptable thresholds. Ideally, a sample size of 600 would provide the power need, 
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allowing for approximately 200 per condition. While our results did indicate a difference in the 
hypothesized direction, an increase in sample size could drastically improve those goodness-of-
fit statistics. Furthermore, in the present study, we encountered a few commonly found numerical 
analysis problems associated with structural equation modeling. Although both of the models 
converged, such estimation problems could slow the movement to factor analytic-based analyses. 
Finally, the models were applied to IPIP Big Five questionnaire data. The IPIP is a 
commonly used questionnaire, but other questionnaires assessing the Big Five as well as other 
personality constructs should be used to determine how well the proposed faking method factor 
generalized to those constructs.  
 
Future Research 
The present study is one in a sequence of studies that have been done to establish the 
method factor as a pure measure of faking. However, much of the research has been conducted 
on convenience samples, such as the undergraduates that were assessed in this study. Though the 
use of student has been great in determining the theoretical underpinnings of the method factor, 
future research should focus on using incumbents to replicate the application of model in Figure 
1. If the method factor is replicated in the practical realm, it is possible that more weight will be 
given to the conclusions drawn from the studies on factor-analytic techniques as a means to 
measure faking. 
Future directions of research should also focus on improving the strength of the incentive 
condition. Competing for a $50 gift card, as is the case in this context, may not have a strong 
enough effect to show a significant difference in the incentive condition. However the 
construction of effective incentive conditions could prove to be beneficial in the literature. 
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Additionally, future studies should explore the factors used in the studies as indicators of 
the method factors to increase the evidence for these characteristics. Additionally, there is still a 
great deal of variance unaccounted for in the method factor because it is groundbreaking. 
Therefore, exploratory studies are needed to dissect the method factor and understand the 
behavioral characteristics associated with the method factor. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
One of the main primary concerns regarding the study of faking has been the lack of a 
useful measure of faking obtainable in applicant settings. McFarland and Ryan (2006) noted that 
it is critical that a construct-valid measure of faking behavior be developed for applicant 
samples. Measures of social desirability were often used in such contexts, but the use of social 
desirability has routinely provided mixed results regarding it ability to measure and control for 
faking. Similarly, difference scores, though valid as measures of faking, are not feasible in most 
applicant settings. The future of the faking research lies in finding a method of measuring faking 
that is theoretically sound and feasible within the selection paradigm. Through this investigation 
of the method factor of faking, it follows that the method factor measures considered here, 
though the method has not received much empirical attention, may be usable in such a context. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
BIG FIVE QUESTIONNAIRE FROM WEBSITE 1 
 
 Rating Scale 
SD MD D N A MA SA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 I am the life of the party. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
2 I feel little concern for others. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
3 I am always prepared. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
4 I get stressed out easily. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
5 I have a rich vocabulary. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
6 I don't talk a lot. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
7 I am interested in people. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
8 I leave my belongings around. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
9 I am relaxed most of the time. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
10 I have difficulty understanding abstract ideas. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
11 I feel comfortable around people.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
12 I insult people.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
13 I pay attention to details.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
14 I worry about things.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
15 I have a vivid imagination.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
16 I keep in the background.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
17 I sympathize with others' feelings.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
18 I make a mess of things.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
19 I seldom feel blue.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
20 I am not interested in abstract ideas.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
21 I start conversations.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
22 I am not interested in other people's problems.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
23 I get chores done right away.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
24 I am easily disturbed.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
25 I have excellent ideas. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
26 I have little to say.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
27 I have a soft heart.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
28 I often forget to put things back in their proper place.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
29 I get upset easily.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
30 I do not have a good imagination.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
31 I talk to a lot of different people at parties.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
32 I am not really interested in others.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
33 I like order.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
34 I change my mood a lot.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
35 I am quick to understand things.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
36 I don’t like to draw attention to myself.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
37 I take time out for others.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
38 I shirk my duties.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
39 I have frequent mood swings.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
40 I use difficult words.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
41 I don’t mind being the center of attention.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
42 I feel others’ emotions.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
43 I follow a schedule.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
44 I get irritated easily.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
45 I spend time reflecting on things.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
46 I am quiet around strangers.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
47 I make people feel at ease.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
48 I am exacting in my work.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
49 I often feel blue.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
50 I am full of ideas.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
49 
APPENDIX C 
 
BIG FIVE QUESTIONNAIRE FROM WEBSITE 2 
 
 Rating Scale 
SD MD D N A MA SA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 I make friends easily. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
2 I am indifferent to the feelings of others. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
3 I am hard to get to know. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
4 I am not easily bothered by things. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
5 I have difficulty imagining things. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
6 I find it difficult to approach others.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
7 I neglect my duties. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
8 I waste my time. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
9 I often feel uncomfortable around others. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
10 I avoid difficult reading material. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
11 I take charge. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
12 I inquire about others' well-being. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
13 I do things according to a plan. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
14 I rarely get irritated. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
15 I seldom get mad. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
16 I try to avoid complex people ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
17 I know how to comfort others.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
18 I do things in a half-way manner. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
19 I get angry easily. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
20 I will not probe deeply into a subject. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
21 I know how to captivate people. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
22 I love children. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
23 I continue until everything is perfect. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
24 I panic easily. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
25 I carry the conversation to a higher level. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
26 I feel at ease with people. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
27 I bottle up my feelings. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
28 I am on good terms with nearly everyone.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
29 I find it difficult to get down to work. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
30 I feel threatened easily. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
31 I catch on to things quickly. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
32 I have a good word for everyone. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
33 I make plans and stick to them. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
34 I get overwhelmed by emotions. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
35 I can handle a lot of information. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
36 I am a very private person. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
37 I show my gratitude. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
38 I leave a mess in my room. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
39 I take offense easily. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
40 I am good at many things. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
41 I wait for others to lead the way. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
42 I think of others first. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
43 I love order and regularity. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
44 I get caught up in my problems. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
45 I love to read challenging material. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
46 I am skilled in handling social situations. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
47 I love to help others. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
48 I like to tidy up. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
49 I grumble about things. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
50 I love to think up new ways of doing things.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
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APPENDIX D 
 
ROSENBERG SELF-ESTEEM MEASURE 
 
 Rating Scale 
SD MD D N A MA SA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 I feel I have a number of good qualities. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
2 I wish I could have more respect for myself.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
3 I feel like I am a person of worth, at least on an equal plane 
with others.  
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
4 I feel I do not have much to be proud of.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
5 I take a positive attitude toward myself.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
6 I certainly feel useless at times. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
7 All in all, I am inclined to feel I am a failure.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
8 I am able to do things as well as most other people.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
9 At times I think I am no good at all.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
10 On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
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COSTELLO AND COMREY DEPRESSION MEASURE 
 
 Rating Scale 
SD MD D N A MA SA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 I feel that life is worthwhile.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
2 When I wake up in the morning I expect to have a miserable 
day. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
3 I wish I were never born. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
4 I feel that there is more disappointment in life than 
satisfaction. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
5 I want to run away from everything. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
6 My future looks hopeful and promising. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
7 When I get up in the morning I expect to have an interesting 
day. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
8 Living is a wonderful adventure for me. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
9 I am a happy person. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
10 Things have worked out well for me. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
11 The future looks so gloomy that I wonder if I should go on. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
12 I feel that life is drudgery and boredom. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
13 I feel blue and depressed. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
14 When I look back I think life has been good to me. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
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BALANCED INVENTORY OF DESIRABLE RESPONDING 
 
 Rating Scale 
SD MD D N A MA SA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Self Deception 
1 My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
2 It would be hard for me to break any of my bad habits. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
3 I don't care to know what other people really think of me. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
4 I have not always been honest with myself.  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
5 I always know why I like things. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
6 When my emotions are aroused, it biases my thinking. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
7 Once I've made up my mind, other people can seldom change my opinion. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
8 I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed limit. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
9 I am fully in control of my own fate. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
10 It's hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
11 I never regret my decisions. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
12 I sometimes lose out on things because I can't make up my mind soon 
enough. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
13 The reason I vote is because my vote can make a difference. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
14 My parents were not always fair when they punished me. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
15 I am a completely rational person. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
16 I rarely appreciate criticism. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
17 I am very confident of my judgments. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
18 I have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
19 It's all right with me if some people happen to dislike me. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
20 I don't always know the reasons why I do the things I do. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Impression Management 
21 I sometimes tell lies if I have to. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
22 I never cover up my mistakes. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
23 There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
24 I never swear. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
25 I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
26 I always obey laws, even if I’m unlikely to get caught. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
27 I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
28 When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
29 I have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him or 
her. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
30 I always declare everything at customs. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
31 When I was young I sometimes stole things. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
32 I have never dropped litter on the street. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
33 I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
34 I never read sexy books or magazines. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
35 I have done things that I don't tell other people about. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
36 I never take things that don't belong to me. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
37 I have taken sick-leave from work or school even though I wasn't really sick. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
38 I have never damaged a library book or store merchandise without reporting 
it. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
39 I have some pretty awful habits. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
40 I don't gossip about other people's business. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
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SCREEN SHOTS FROM WEBSITE 1 
Big Five Questionnaire Instructions  
 
Big Five Questionnaire 
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SCREEN SHOTS FROM WEBSITE 2 
Welcome Screens 
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Rosenberg Self-Esteem Measure  
 
Costello and Comrey Depression Measure  
 
60 
Balance Inventory of Desirable Responding (Self-Deception Scale) 
 
Balance Inventory of Desirable Responding (Impression Management Scale) 
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Condition Instructions – Honest  
 
Condition Instructions – Instructed Faking  
 
Condition Instructions – Incentive 
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IPIP 50-Item Big Five Questionnaire  
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Incentive Page (Prize Drawing Form) 
 
Final Page (Thank You) 
 
